Metro Transit’s internal performance standard of 98.7 percent was established for the timeliness of preventive maintenance inspections. In 1997, Metro Transit completed 96.4 percent of its inspections on time. While the percentage of buses inspected "on-time" was slightly below the 98.7 percent standard, the overall timeliness of the inspection program was excellent.

However, the quality of Metro Transit’s preventive maintenance inspections was inconsistent and could be improved based upon the findings of the Vehicle Maintenance Section’s internal quality assurance reviews. Specific issues identified in quality assurance reports included inconsistent inspection practices from base to base and inspector to inspector; no identification of significant repair items during the inspections; and delayed completion of some repair items. Metro Transit implemented a more broadly focused quality assurance program in 1998 that addresses inspections, maintenance operations, repairs, materials management, safety, and environment. Metro Transit’s Vehicle Maintenance Section manager directly followed up important issues identified during recent quality assurance reviews.

The audit recommended that Metro Transit continue to refine the newly implemented quality assurance program to ensure that its inspections and maintenance standards are maintained and to improve service reliability, as discussed in Finding 2-3.

Safety is a crucial vehicle maintenance objective at Metro Transit, so accidents due to mechanical failure were reviewed during the audit. The results indicated that only four accidents were caused by mechanical failures between 1992 and 1997, thus Metro Transit’s mechanical safety record was excellent.

(Correspondence #6, Background II #35; General Manager’s Report)

However, Metro Transit had the highest number of maintenance interruptions due to mechanical failures among the peer transit systems in 1997. Interruptions due to other transportation incidents were also very high, at 178 percent of the system average, and miles between trouble calls was 55 percent below the average. The significance of these reliability measures is that the quality and consistency of Metro Transit’s repair program needs to be improved.

The audit recommended that Metro Transit continue to implement its bus procurement program to improve the reliability of its fleet and implement more consistent reviews of completed inspections and repairs to ensure the effectiveness of maintenance services.

Metro Transit’s maintenance work hours were approximately 10 percent lower than the peer transit system average based upon the reported maintenance work hours per maximum service bus and vehicle miles. Metro Transit reported 27% more work hours than the peer system average, but a 10 percent lower work hour rate per maximum service bus and vehicle miles than the peer transit systems. However, the reported work hours raise questions about the effectiveness of Metro Transit’s maintenance operation, particularly given its low service reliability rates.

The low service reliability rates were also a concern because the Vehicle Maintenance Section’s overtime expenditures have exceeded the annual overtime budget by approximately $0.5 million to $1.3 million during the five-year review period. While excess overtime expenditures are not unusual in the transit industry, Metro Transit’s work hours and reliability statistics suggested that the maintenance function might not be appropriately managed and staffed. For example, the maintenance statistics and comparative analyses suggest that Metro Transit could improve its maintenance performance by limiting overtime assignments to priority workloads; establishing shop rate standards for routine repair and inspection activities; and through better management oversight and reporting including accountability and exceptions reporting.

The audit recommended that Metro Transit review its current maintenance practices to determine why its service reliability rates are not consistent with its lower work hour (e.g., higher productivity) levels. In addition, Metro Transit should use overtime resources to reduce mechanical problems that result in frequent interruptions and trouble calls rather than non-priority workload. Metro Transit should also establish shop rate standards for routine inspections and maintenance tasks, and improve its maintenance management information system to routinely identify exceptions to the established standards.

Finding 3-2. Metro Transit’s Materials and Parts Inventory Management Practices Were Not Effective, Resulting in Excessive Parts Purchasing, Poor Inventory Performance, and Inefficient Use of Taxpayer Resources.

Metro Transit adopted a 100 percent parts availability standard for its six maintenance facilities and decentralized some materials and inventory management functions to give base supervisors and chiefs greater control over the parts required for scheduled repairs. However, maintenance personnel ordered new parts that were in stock at other bases, and quantities of stock that were higher than the recommended quantities. The result was that parts purchasing outpaced the demand for the parts available in the inventory. Metro Transit’s ineffective parts practices resulted in a low inventory turn rate, which was substantially lower (62 percent to 75 percent) than the recommended inventory standard of four to six turns annually.

Factors that contributed to Metro Transit’s low inventory turn rate included the purchase of discontinued parts that are not likely to be used, such as $1.9 million worth of Breda parts. Metro Transit also adopted a practice of gradually reducing surplus items in 1996 due to media criticism regarding the sale of $1.5 million of retired buses and surplus parts for only $80,000 or six percent of the original transaction value. The media and public perceived that Metro Transit’s purchasing practices were wasteful due to the small amount of revenue generated from the sale of the surplus parts.

The Materials Management Section is now selectively purchasing parts from the original equipment manufacturers’ recommended parts lists and including vendor buy-back agreements in its procurement contracts. A greater effort is also being made to level out parts among the bases prior to ordering new parts. (Please see relevant recommendations after Finding 3-3.)