The Constitution of the State of Washington vests legislative power in the legislature and in the people. Article II, § 1 is clear. It reserves to the people "the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature and . . . at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature." Article II, § 1 goes on to describe the exercise of such power through initiative and referendum.

The powers of initiative and referendum were not original provisions of the Washington State Constitution when it was ratified in 1889. Amendment 7, which departs from the idea of representational democracy to direct democracy, was proposed by the Washington State Legislature in 19ll and ratified by the voters in 1912. Its ratification permits direct participation by citizens in governance through legislative acts, creating for our state, a parallel method of enacting legislation to that of the legislature. In approving an initiative measure, the people are exercising the same power of sovereignty that the Legislature exercises when it enacts a statute. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 556 (1995) (citing In re Estate of Thompson, 103 Wn.2d 292, 294 (1984)).

A bedrock principle of American democracy is that our laws must comply with the Constitution, whether that law was enacted by the legislature or directly by the people through an initiative process. Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 824 (2001). As early as 1933 our state was reminded that "the people when legislating, the legislature, and the courts, are and should be bound by the limitations, restrictions, definitions and prohibitions of the Constitution" because it is the fundamental law of the state. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash 363, 379 (1933).

It is not the prerogative of the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the electorate in enacting initiatives, although it is the court's duty to set aside an initiative that clearly contravenes constitutional provisions. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275 (1974). Conversely, the court may not invalidate laws based upon considerations of public policy; only a constitutional violation justifies such a judicial intervention into the legislative processes. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State ("ATU"), 142 Wn.2d 183, 205 (2000).

On November 5, 2002, the voters of the State of Washington approved ballot measure Initiative 776 ("I-776"). This matter now comes before the court on cross motions: 1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, asking that the court declare, as a matter of law, that I-776 does not comport with our State Constitution; and 2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment asking that the court declare that I-776 meets all Constitutional requirements and is thus, constitutional.

The case was first filed on November 27, 2002. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that I-776 is unconstitutional. On December 2, 2002, the complaint was amended and King County joined the lawsuit.

Plaintiffs subsequently requested an order enjoining the State's implementation of the Initiative on December 5, 2002, the date that I-776 was to take effect. The State objected to the Motion and an expedited hearing was set on the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. After hearing from Plaintiffs and the State of Washington, this court entered an order on December 4, 2002 temporarily enjoining the implementation of I-776 in the Counties of King and Pierce until a hearing on the merits could be scheduled. The parties subsequently submitted a summary judgment briefing schedule with a hearing date of January 31, 2003.

On December 16, 2002, this court, by stipulation of the parties, allowed the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority ("Sound Transit"), the City of Kenmore, the King County Labor Council, the Washington State Labor Council, 1000 Friends of Washington, Transportation Choices Coalition, and the Sierra Club to intervene in this action. The briefing schedule was amended without adjusting the hearing date.

Soon after, Salish Village Condominium Association and G. Dennis Vaughn moved to intervene in this action and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that I-776 is constitutional and that Sound Transit was not legally formed and thus unconstitutional as an entity. On December 27, 2002, this court granted the Motion to Intervene but limited the claims to the constitutionality of I-776.

On January 23, 2003, PERMANENT OFFENSE moved to intervene in support of finding I-776 constitutional. This court granted the Motion and allowed PERMANENT OFFENSE to file legal memoranda in support of its position and to present oral argument at the hearing. The hearing on summary judgment was held on January 31, 2003.

I-776, titled "AN ACT Relating to limiting government-imposed charges on motor vehicles," was filed with the Secretary of State on January 7, 2002, as an Initiative to the people. Pursuant to article II, § 1 of the Washington Constitution, I-776 received a ballot title and ballot measure summary prepared by the Office of Attorney General. The ballot title reads as follows: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed. Should this measure be enacted into law? Within the time period prescribed by the Washington Constitution, the proponents of I-776 obtained enough valid petition signatures from Washington voters to qualify the measure for the 2002 general election ballot. On November 5, 2002, the voters approved I-776 by majority vote. Pursuant to the Washington Constitution (Art. II, § 2), I-776 was scheduled to take effect 30 days after the election, on December 5, 2002.

I-776 is divided into 11 sections. Section 2 of I-776 sets all license tabs at $30.00 per year for cars, sport utility vehicles, motorcycles, and motor homes. The applicable statute is amended as follows: "License tabs ((shall be thirty dollars)) are required to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, regardless of year, value, make or model ((, beginning January 2, 2000)). Section 3 reduces the fees on light trucks (less than 10,000 lbs.) to $30.00."

Section 4 repeals local authorization to collect a special motor vehicle excise tax previously imposed under RCW 35.58.273. Section 5 states that the "following acts or parts of acts are repealed" and sets forth a list of section numbers of certain laws. Some of the statutes were previously repealed by the legislature and others affect the administration of the repealed taxes. Section 6 repeals the authority of certain transit agencies to impose a motor vehicle excise tax under RCW 81.104.160. Section 8 repeals authorization to impose a local-option vehicle license fee. Section 9 is a construction clause which directs that the provisions of the law are to be liberally construed. Section 10 is a severability clause intended to allow a provision to survive if any other provision is held invalid. Section 11 is entitled "Legislative Intent" and it contains a number of statements, political in nature, directed at public officials.

The remaining sections of the Initiative, Sections 1 and 7 are statements entitled, "Policies and Purposes," and "Legislative Intent Relating to Outstanding Bonds." It is sections 1 and 7 that give rise to several constitutional questions regarding the scope of Initiative 776. These sections are discussed more fully in a separate section of this Memorandum.

Pierce County and Sound Transit challenge the constitutionality of I-776 under a number of provisions of the Washington State Constitution. While not all of the arguments will be addressed by the court, it is important to mention the grounds on which the plaintiffs bring this complaint. Plaintiffs allege violations of: 1. Article II, § 19, cl. 1 (single subject requirement - that no bill contain more than one subject); 2. Article II, § 19, cl. 2 (subject-in-title requirement - that the measure's subject be disclosed in the ballot title); 3. Article II, § 37 (revising or amending statutes by mere reference without setting them forth in full - that the proposed legislation fully disclose all of the statutes that it will revise or amend to the voters): 4. Article II, § 23 (impairment of contracts - that no legislation will impair pre-existing contractual obligations); 5. Article II, § 28 (limiting special legislation - that legislation will not target or favor specific groups with special legislation); 6. Article I, § 12 (prohibiting special privileges and immunities) and § 19 (freedom of elections - that all citizens will be protected equally from unfair treatment); 7. Article I, § 3 (due process of law - that every citizen will be provided due process under the law); 8. Article II, § 1 (exercise of initiative power - that initiatives may only effect legislative decisions and not administrative decisions); 9. Article XI, § 4 (charter counties) and § 12 (assessment and collection of taxes in municipalities - that citizens have the right to local self-government).

Similar to laws enacted by the Legislature, a statute enacted through the initiative process is presumed to be constitutional and great deference must be afforded to this presumption. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 205. This court is mindful of the burden of proof requiring that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality must be proven to be unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt". The standard is met only "if argument and research show that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution". ATU 142 Wn.2d at 205.

Article II, §19 of the Washington State Constitution requires that legislation must contain only one subject. "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Wash. Const. Art. II, §19. Our courts have established that this constitutional requirement of a single subject applies to initiatives. Thus, I-776 must undergo the same constitutional review under Article. II, § 19 as any other legislative enactment. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 551-558 (1995).

The purpose of the "single subject" clause is to prohibit the drafter of a law from combining two separate subjects into one measure. Its practical effect is to prevent the enactment of an unpopular provision pertaining to one subject by combining it with a popular provision whose subject is unrelated. Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 825 (2001) (citing Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191 (1951)). This practice is commonly referred to as "logrolling." "Logrolling" traditionally entails putting two separate proposals together under the same general bill and presenting it to the legislature or the people. A frequently utilized citation by former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Rosselini best summarizes the problem of logrolling: Logrolling is an even greater danger to the democratic exercise of power in the initiative process. What is to prevent an individual or group from including mildly objectionable legislation -- that is, legislation which might benefit a small group and is mildly disfavored by the electorate as a whole -- in an initiative measure which includes other legislation which has great popular appeal? . . . The legislature can delete parts of a proposal it disfavors; the electorate is faced with a Hobson's choice: reject what it likes or adopt what it dislikes. Only article 2, section 19 preserves the dignity of the initiative process. Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d at 333 (1974) (Rosselini, J., dissenting).

The single subject clause of our Constitution protects the rule that each bill or act of legislation should be voted on separately. The clause ensures that each enactment adopted by the legislature or by the people has been fully considered and approved on its own merits. As a result, each law is constitutionally required to be individually identified and described in the title, and to deal with only one subject.

Due to the dangers of logrolling and the inability of a court to determine which provisions would have garnered a majority vote if they had been proposed on their own, it is impossible to declare some sections of an initiative constitutional, and others not. If an initiative does not satisfy the single subject requirement, it is deemed unconstitutional in its entirety and a court may not sever any sections simply to save one of the provisions. See Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 825.

The analysis of whether an initiative or bill contains more than one subject requires a twofold level of inquiry: 1) is the ballot title general or restrictive; and 2) if such a title is general, whether there is rational unity among the sections or subsections.

The Legislature or drafter of an initiative may choose to adopt a very broad and comprehensive title for a bill. In such a general usage of the title, great liberality will be applied to find that any subject reasonably germane to such a title may be embraced within the body of the bill or proposed legislation. Article II, § 19 would not be violated, for example, if a general subject contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions.

In contrast, a restrictive title "is one where a particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation." ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 210. A restrictive title expressly limits the scope of the act to that expressed in the title and it is of specific import rather than generic.

In assessing whether a title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the subject of an act; a few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 209. Even where a ballot title sets forth considerable detail regarding the contents of the measure, a general statement of the subject may emerge from those details. For example, in State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736 (1996) the Court distilled the single subject of "persistent offenders" from a ballot title that read: "Shall criminals who are convicted of 'most serious offenses' on three occasions be sentenced to life in prison without parole?" The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to I 695, finding that although some elements of the title seemed restricting, other elements broadened its scope such that the title was general. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 216 - 217.

In this case, all of the parties, except Sound Transit, agree that the ballot title of I-776 is general. Sound Transit argues that the Initiative's focus on the $30.00 license tab fee creates a narrow topical scope and is thus restrictive. Sound Transit's argument would have merit if the ballot title had been limited solely to establishing the $30.00 fee. Instead, the ballot title of I-776 also includes provisions regarding certain local option excise taxes and fees for roads and transit in order to achieve a lower level of tax burden on auto licensing fees. Although the primary statement relates to the $30.00 fees, this court finds that mention of the repeal of local option excise taxes in the title sufficiently broadens the title beyond the restrictive $30.00 license fee so that the ballot title is general rather than restrictive.

The second step in a single subject inquiry asks whether there is rational unity between the general subject and the individual subsections. Are the disparate sections of the act unified by a single concept? An initiative may include different subjects or parts under a general title and remain constitutional under the single subject clause if the subjects or sections are related to each other and to the title. Burien, 144 Wn.2d at 826 (citing ATU, 142 Wn.2d 183 (2000)). Relying on case precedent, Justice Madsen in ATU reminds us of the principle: Under the true rule of construction, the scope of the general title should be held to embrace any provision of the act, directly or indirectly related to the subject expressed in the title and having a natural connection thereto, and not foreign thereto. Or, the rule may be stated as follows: Where the title of a legislative act expresses a general subject or purpose which is single, all matters which are naturally and reasonably connected with it, and all measures which will, or may, facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose so stated, are properly included in the act and are germane to its title. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 209 (citing Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wn.2d 392, 403 (1966) (quoting Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 22, 23 (1949)). The single subject requirement is violated only if there is no rational unity among the sections and requirements of the initiative.

The State and Intervenor Defendants argue that the constitutional inquiry is limited to the measure itself and that any reference to the Voters' Pamphlet, campaign materials or media reports is irrelevant. Pierce County, on the other hand, argues that the full intent and meaning of the Initiative can only be determined by reference to the Voter's Pamphlet and that consideration of such materials is part of the rational unity - single subject inquiry. Finally, Sound Transit argues that referral to the Voters Pamphlet should be utilized for the purposes of showing that Section 7 of the Initiative was a subject intended to help garner votes in favor of the Initiative.

A source of debate among the parties arises in reference to the Court's opinion in ATU where the Court stated: In deciding whether a measure contains a single subject, however, the constitutional inquiry is founded on the question whether a measure is drafted in such a way that those voting on it may be required to vote for something of which the voter disapproved in order to obtain approval of an unrelated law. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash 2d at 552, 901 P.2d 1028; Wash Toll Bridge Auth. V. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 525, 304 P.2d 676 (1956). Thus, regardless of what is in the voters pamphlet or the history of the initiative, the rational relationship inquiry centers on what is in the measure itself, i.e., whether the measure contains unrelated laws. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 212.

While the rule of law is clearly expressed by the court in ATU, the context of the rule is relevant. As Sound Transit and Pierce County point out, the State in that case was attempting to create a single, rationally unified subject by pointing to language in the Voter's Pamphlet instead of the language in the Initiative itself. The Court in ATU specifically rejected such supplementation in order to determine whether the Initiative contained more than one subject.

This court is of the view that in general, the rational relationship inquiry centers on what is in the body of the initiative itself without reference to extraneous materials. However, if there is a question about the meaning or purpose of a particular provision within the initiative, in order to decide whether the subject is related, the proper method of analysis considers the "legislative" history. In cases involving initiatives, this includes the Voter's Pamphlet.

Thus, the next step is to look to the body of the Initiative and ask whether there is rational unity among the numerous sections with each other and with the title.

The State and Defendant Intervenors argue that the single subject of I-776 is "state and local government charges on motor vehicles" and that its unified purpose is to "limit motor vehicle excise taxes and fees to $30.00 per year for cars and light trucks, and to eliminate any remaining legal barriers to achieving this goal."

Pierce County argues that the Initiative contains two subjects: 1) limiting license tab fee and taxes for cars and pick-up trucks to $30.00 and 2) forcing a re-vote on Sound Transit light rail. Pierce County further argues that the Initiative also violates the single subject clause by presenting four purposes which destroys rational unity between the matters embraced in the act. They argue that the four purposes are: 1) force a revote on Sound Transit's light rail; 2) take away the right of local voters to vote on local taxes for local transportation projects; 3) veto the locally approved Sound Transit MVET and the locally adopted $15 fee in King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Douglas Counties; and 4) lower the State license tab fee for pick-up trucks (but not cars) to $30.

Sound Transit argues that I-776 contains three subjects that are not closely related: 1) $30.00 license tabs; 2) requiring or encouraging that there be a future vote on light rail in Seattle; and 3) eliminating the voters' right to approve future taxes for future transportation projects. Sound Transit further argues that the required rational unity of the Initiative is destroyed by the two unrelated purposes that it seeks to achieve: 1) set license tab fees at $30.00 and 2) establish a legislative policy encouraging public votes on transportation programs that are not funded by and thus do not affect the $30.00 fee.

The opening sentence of the ballot title is statutorily defined as the measure's statement of the subject while the remaining sentences constitute the concise description of the content. RCW 29.79.035(1). [Statement of Subject] Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. [Concise Description of Content] This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed. In a broad sense, I-776 deals with state and local government charges on motor vehicles. Specifically, it seeks to set license tab fees at $30.00 by repealing certain local-option taxes or fees.

As mentioned previously in this Memorandum, I-776 is divided into 11 sections. For purposes of single subject analysis only, and setting aside Sections 1 and 7 for further discussion below, the operative and relevant sections are sections 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8.

Sections 2 and 3 sets tab fees at $30.00 for cars and trucks. Sections 4 and 6 repeal local governmental and certain transit agencies' authorization to impose and collect motor vehicle excise taxes, and finally, Section 8 repeals authority to impose a local option vehicle license fee.

Utilizing the previously outlined analysis, this court finds that each of these sections is germane to the single general subject of setting license tab fees at $30.00 and repealing certain local-option fees or taxes. While the repeal of certain taxes or fees involves numerous subsections, the complexity or result of such repeal does not destroy the fact that they are nevertheless united in purpose. These specific provisions are all germane to limiting the amount of state and local government charges that motor vehicle owners must pay upon the registration or renewed registration of a vehicle. Setting the state license tab fee at $30 for motor vehicles and light trucks, and repealing previously granted authority for local governments or transit authorities to levy such fees or taxes are all "germane" to this subject. Therefore, these sections are all germane to this purpose and rational unity exists among these provisions.

The content of sections 1 and 7 raise questions about the scope of the Initiative and whether a second subject has been introduced. Because of their import, these sections are set forth in their entirety

Section 1 is entitled "Policies and Purposes." It is a compilation of 11 sentences regarding a number of topics related to taxes, public accountability and transportation. Of specific concern are sentences eight and nine which have been set out by the court in bold and italics.
POLICIES AND PURPOSES Sec. 1. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles and light trucks and would repeal certain government-imposed charges, including excise taxes and fees, levied on motor vehicles. Politicians promised "$30 license tabs are here to stay" and promised any increases in vehicle-related taxes, fees and surcharges would be put to a public vote. Politicians should keep their promises. As long as taxpayers must pay incredibly high sales taxes when buying motor vehicles (meaning state and local governments receive huge windfalls of sales tax revenue from these transactions), the people want license tab fees to not exceed the promised $30 per year. Without this follow-up measure, "tab creep" will continue until license tab fees are once again obscenely expensive, as they were prior to Initiative 695. The people want a public vote on any increases in vehicle-related taxes, fees and surcharges to ensure increased accountability. Voters will require more cost-effective use of existing revenues and fundamental reforms before approving higher charges on motor vehicles (such changes may remove the need for any increases). Also, dramatic changes to transportation plans and programs previously presented to voters must be resubmitted. This measure provides a strong directive to all taxing districts to obtain voter approval before imposing taxes, fees and surcharges on motor vehicles. However, if the legislature ignores this clear message, a referendum will be filed to protect the voters' rights. Politicians should just do the right thing and keep their promises.
Section 7 is entitled "Legislative Intent Relating to Outstanding Bonds" and it contains only three sentences. The words set in bold and italics by the court are relevant to the parties' arguments.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT RELATING TO OUTSTANDING BONDS Sec. 7. If the repeal of taxes in section 6 of this act affects any bonds previously issued for any purpose relating to light rail, the people expect transit agencies to retire these bonds using reserve funds including accrued interest, sale of property or equipment, new voter approved tax revenues, or any combination of these sources of revenue. Taxing districts should abstain from further bond sales for any purpose relating to light rail until voters decide this measure. The people encourage transit agencies to put another tax revenue measure before voters if they want to continue with a light rail system dramatically changed from that previously represented to and approved by voters.

Pierce County argues that sections 1 and 7 are specific texts within the body of the Initiative that should not only be considered by the court, but also held legally enforceable. Relying on Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827 (1965), Pierce County invites this court to hold that Section 1 should have the force of law because of the mandatory language within it and because Sections 1 and 7 fundamentally reveal the "real" purpose of I-776, as evidenced in the Voter's Pamphlet.

Sound Transit argues that while Sections 1 and 7 are not legally enforceable, they nevertheless ask the voter to establish a legislative policy regarding when public votes should be held on transportation programs without regard to license tabs and fees. The end result in their view is that one of I-776's purposes is either to mandate or encourage Sound Transit to conduct a public vote of the light rail project thereby destroying any rational unity between these and the other sections.

The State and Defendant Intervenors argue that sections 1 and 7 are precatory in nature and thus, are of no legal consequence. They assert that since Section 1 is entitled "Policies and Purposes," the statements were simply expressions of the desired consequences of the passage of I-776. Under their analysis, such declarations have no operative force of law and are inconsequential.

In regard to Section 7, the State and Defendant Intervenors point to its own plain terms (use of the words "expect," "should" and "encourage") as evidence that there is no mandatory duty imposed on Sound Transit. The State argues that the statements provide guidance for the legislature and Sound Transit regarding what not to do after the passage of I-776. Lastly, each Defendant responded affirmatively at oral argument when asked if the relief sought by Sound Transit should be granted; that is entering an order of declaratory judgment stating that I-776 creates no legally binding obligations on Sound Transit to repay bonds early or conduct a re-vote on light rail.

Arguments from Defendants and Pierce County regarding Sections 1 and 7 seemingly rest on this court first finding that these sections are either precatory or mandatory -- that is whether they are policy expressions of no consequence or legally enforceable obligations.

Sections 1 and 7 are paragraphs contained within the text of the Initiative itself and contrary to assertions by Defendants, this court cannot simply ignore the Sections or strike them from the Initiative because they are precatory.

The underlying purpose inherent in judicial interpretation of statutory enactments is to effectuate the objective or intent of the legislating body by looking to the statutory context as a whole. The declaration of aims, purposes, and intent is a constituent part of the act and is to be considered in construing, interpreting, and administering it. Whatcom County v. Langlie, 40 Wn.2d 855, 863 (1952).

However, our State Supreme Court has also held that policy statements in legislative enactments do not in fact create legal obligations. Rather, such statements serve as an important guide in understanding the intended effect of the operative sections. State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16 (1916).

In the case of Krsyad v. Lau, cited by Pierce County, our Supreme Court did give substantive effect to the policy statement in the little Norris-LaGuardia Act. However, the Court subsequently acknowledged that by doing so in that particular case, it was not their intent to lay down a new rule regarding the import of policy statements contained in legislation. Operating Engineers v. Sand Point, 83 Wn.2d 498 (1974).

The eleven sentences in Section 1 are all placed under the heading of "Policies and Purposes" and none of the sentences reference any particular statute or mechanism for effectuating the policy. The three sentences under Section 7 are placed under the heading of "Legislative Intent Relating to Outstanding Bonds."

Consistent with the court's limited role of review, this court declines the invitation to legislate judicially certain legal obligations into being under the guise of interpreting or construing the precatory provision. This court agrees with Defendants and Sound Transit that the language itself is evidence that they are pure policy expressions. The words "expect," "should," and "encourage" are of themselves non-binding directives. Sections 1 and 7 are not mandatory provisions and do not create a legally binding obligation on Sound Transit to repay bonds early or to conduct a revote on light rail.

In order for an Initiative to survive judicial scrutiny under the constitutional single subject analysis, the court must find that all of the provisions have rational unity with the title and with each other. As stated by our Supreme Court In order to survive . . . rational unity must exist among all matters included within the measure and the general topic expressed in the title. Only where rational unity exists can we be certain voters were not required to vote for an unrelated subject of which the voters disapproved in order to pass a law pertaining to a subject of which the voters were committed. Burien, 144 Wn.2d at 826.

Having previously established that Sections 1 and 7 have no legal consequence, does the inclusion of these provisions within the body of the Initiative destroy rational unity for purposes of single subject analysis? While the parties disagree on the answer, all agree that this is a case of first impression since our Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether a precatory provision within an initiative can introduce a second subject.

Therefore, in attempting to answer the question, this court will first ask what subjects are included in these sections of the Initiative? The State argues 1) that Section 1 and 7 are purely precatory, 2) that they outline "desires or expectations" for future transportation changes or charges to be presented to the voters, and 3) that because they are not enforceable, they do not violate the single subject rule.

Pierce County argues 1) that Sections 1 and 7 were included to either mandate or encourage Sound Transit to conduct a public re-vote of the light rail project and 2) that such inclusion is a classic example of logrolling because it introduces another subject.

For purposes of the single subject inquiry, it is helpful to look at the plain language of these sections. In Section 1, it is clear that the first five sentences relate to $30.00 license tab fees. The sixth and seventh sentences address the desire to have a public vote on vehicle related increases in fees, taxes, and surcharges and a better use of current resources prior to approving such changes. These sentences all relate to the general subject of "state and local government charges on motor vehicles" and to the general purpose of setting license tab fees at $30.00.

Sentence 8 calls for the re-submission of changes to transportation plans and programs to the voters. The court notes the use of mandatory language: "Also, dramatic changes to transportation plans and programs previously presented to voters must be resubmitted."

Sentence 9 is a directive to taxing districts to obtain voter approval before imposing taxes, fees and surcharges on motor vehicles. Finally, sentences 10 and 11 are warnings to public officials that if the message contained in I-776 is not followed, a referendum will be filed.

Section 7 contains three sentences relating to bonds and light rail. Sentence 1 explains that if repeal of the local motor vehicle excise tax in the Initiative affects any bonds issued for light rail, it is expected that the bonds will be retired using reserve funds. Sentences 2 and 3 counsels transit agencies and taxing districts to refrain from further bond sales related to light rail and to put another tax revenue measure before the voters prior to continuing with light rail.

Without relying on the Voter's Pamphlet or extraneous materials, this court concludes that sentence 8 of Section 1 and the three sentences of Section 7 introduce a separate subject into the body of the Initiative. However, the question remains, even if it is a separate subject, is it nevertheless germane to the other sections or the ballot title? The answer is no. While there may be a policy link between the subject of repealing "local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees which fund transit" and "future funding of certain transit projects", the subjects are unrelated for an Article II, § 19 constitutional analysis. The repeal of existent taxes and fees on motor vehicles is very different from the prevention of possible funding of transit projects. Defendants claim that it was not the purpose of the Initiative to force a re-vote on Sound Transit but rather it is a consequence of the approval of I-776. The argument might have merit if the body of the text explained it as such and if a "re-vote" would automatically flow from a repeal of the motor vehicle excise tax. A re-vote on existing transit projects or a re-vote on future funding for transit does not necessarily flow logically or legally from limiting charges on motor vehicles.

The above referenced sentences in the Initiative exceed the scope of a single subject by introducing the topic of "re-votes" or "voter approval" for restoring funds lost due to the Initiative without regard to the $30.00 tab fee. It is true that I-776 eliminates the motor vehicle excise tax as a source of funding for public transportation projects by Sound Transit and other counties, and thus is a source of increase to the $30.00 license fees. However, when I-776 asks voters to establish a policy regarding public votes on transportation programs, there is no connection to license tabs and fees. As argued by Sound Transit, I-776 seeks to achieve two unrelated purposes: 1) set licenses fees at $30.00 and 2) establish a new state policy encouraging public votes on transportation programs that are not funded by and thus, do not affect the $30.00 fee. This court concurs.

Finally, it is irrelevant whether the separate subject was contained in "precatory" sections, since the voter had no choice but to vote for both of these proposals regardless of whether a court would impose a mandatory obligation. Voters should not have to guess whether a section is precatory or mandatory when voting for or against an initiative. Rather, voters should be able to assume that language placed in the body of an initiative serves a legitimate and necessary purpose for effectuating the legislation. By tying the proposals together, I-776 forced voters into a Hobson's choice of having to vote for both or against both. It is possible that there were individual voters who might have wanted to vote affirmatively on setting license tabs at $30.00 but not want to vote for a policy change on transportation because they were supportive of Sound Transit's light rail.

The practical effect is that by tying them together, this Initiative was able to combine the votes of voters who favored $30.00 tab fees with the votes of those who oppose Sound Transit's light rail project. Fidelity to the Constitution's single subject provision, however, requires that the $30.00 tab proposal and the re-vote on light rail proposal each pass on its own merits so that the will of the people can be clearly ascertained.

I-776 violates Article II, § 19 of our Constitution which requires that "no bill shall embrace more than one subject".

The second clause of Article II, § 19 of the Washington State Constitution establishes that every piece of legislation will contain in its title, the subject of the bill. The section states clearly that "[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Wash. Const. Art. II, §19.

Like the single subject rule, the subject-in-title clause applies to initiatives passed by the people as well as bills approved by the legislature. In cases where initiatives are in question the subject-in-title provision deals with the ballot title. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wn.2d at 555.

The fundamental purpose of this constitutional requirement is its notice to the public of the contents of the measure. Our State Supreme Court has recognized the particular importance of this requirement in the context of an initiative, noting that often voters will not reach the text of a measure or the explanatory statement, but may instead cast their votes based on the ballot title. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 217 (citing Wash Fed'n, 127 Wn.2d at 553 - 554). It is the ballot title with which voters are faced in the voting booth.

The title complies with the Constitution if it gives notice which would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or if it indicates the scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind. ATU, 142 Wn.2d at 217. However, the Constitution does not require that a ballot title be exhaustive nor that it contain an index of the contents nor a listing of all of the minute details that the bill contains. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wn.2d at 555.

The goal of the clause is to allow voters to make an informed decision regarding what is contained in the initiative, so as to ensure a clear understanding of its scope and purpose. Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wn2d at 555; See also Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 491- 492 (1965).

The parties in the present case provide widely divergent views on what the ballot title of I-776 contains. Again it is important to recall the entire text of the ballot title: Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed. Should this measure be enacted into law?

Pierce County argues that the ballot title did not inform the voter regarding all of the aspects of legislation found within the Initiative. Specifically, they claim that I-776 would: (1) force a re-vote on Sound Transit's light rail; (2) take away the right of local voters to vote on local taxes for local transportation projects; (3) veto the locally approved Sound Transit MVET and the locally adopted $15 fee in King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Douglas Counties; and (4) lower the State license tab fee for pick-up trucks to $30 but keep cars at $33.50.

Pierce County maintains that the average voter could not have known by reading the ballot title that any of the four consequences above would occur. Sound Transit joins Pierce County in arguing that the subjects in (1) and (3) were not disclosed to the voter in the ballot title.

The State counters that the language of the ballot title did apprise the voters of the general "scope and purpose" of the law and led those voters interested in more detail into an inquiry into the body of the Initiative. They argue that the plaintiffs' request for a more comprehensive title calls for the precise type of details that are not necessary to satisfy Article II, § 19. It is the State's view that since the voter was advised that some of these taxes and fees were to be repealed, it was incumbent upon the voter to read the text of the initiative to discover the applicable taxes and fees.

The principle question regarding I-776 and the subject-in-title inquiry is whether the ballot title sufficiently notified the voters that they were endorsing a policy encouraging a re-vote on transportation programs (light rail). An equally important question is whether the ballot title sufficiently notified voters that I-776 would be taking away the right of local citizens to tax themselves, an entirely different proposition than the repeal of certain taxes and fees. While the ballot title did indicate that certain taxes and fees would be eliminated, it did not indicate how they would be eliminated. The disparity between the title and the text fails to notify voters of the breadth of the law's reach. The omission is critical and irremediable.

Initiative 776 fails to disclose adequately in the ballot title two other provisions, namely: 1) the repeal of authority for local citizens to tax themselves for their own roads and/or transit programs; and 2) the endorsement of a policy on certain transportation programs (light rail). As such, it violates the subject-in-title requirement of the Washington Constitution.

The ultimate issue is not about the intelligence of the voter in understanding the Initiative. Rather, the crucial question at issue is whether the ballot title and text of the Initiative adequately disclosed to the voters what I-776 was really about.

Article I, §23 of our State Constitution guarantees that "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed." Our State Supreme Court has made it clear that legislative nullification of security pledged by a municipal entity in support of previously issued bonds is an unconstitutional impairment of the bond contract with the bond owner. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. O'Brien, 86 Wn.2d 339, 350-352 (1976).

In 1990, King County adopted a local $15.00 vehicle license fee pursuant to RCW 82.80.020. In 2002, prior to the passage of I-776, King County pledged the revenue from these fees as collateral for bonds sold to finance safety and transportation projects in King County. Because I-776 (Section 8) repeals the statute authorizing the locally adopted fee, the question in this case is whether I-776 impairs King County's bond contract with the bond owners.

The State and Intervenor Defendants argue that there is no impairment of contract because King County disclosed the pendency of I-776 and also pledged revenue from other sources that would fully cover the obligation. While the State and Intervenor Defendants raise issues about the timing of the pledge (one month before the election), and the political motives of the County's leadership, this court does not find those issues relevant to the constitutional inquiry. There has been no issue raised on whether there is a legitimate contract between the County and the bondholders.

The State argues that there is no evidence that the bondholders justifiably relied on revenues from the fee in deciding whether to purchase the bonds, and that they knew that fee collection was contingent on the County's legal ability to continue collecting the tax. The State and Defendant Intervenors bolster their argument by pointing to representations made by the County that other revenues would be available and utilized if necessary for repayment. Lastly, the State asks this court to find a way to prevent local governments from using last-minute bond pledges as a convenient way to "lock-in" their continued authority to keep collecting unpopular taxes in the face of initiatives or other legislative actions.

Our Supreme Court has held that the sale of municipal bonds for purposes of borrowing money creates a contract protected by the impairment of contracts clause. The Court established that a contract is "impaired by a statute which alters its terms, imposes new conditions, or lessens its value". Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 123 Wn.2d 391, 404 (1994).

The question of the effect of legislation on bond contracts was squarely addressed in Tyrpak v. Daniels, 124 Wn.2d 146 (1994). There the Court held that a statute which detrimentally affected the tax revenue stream, even though there was sufficient revenue to meet the bond obligation, was unconstitutional under the contracts impairment clause. The rule of inquiry that emerges from that case which is applicable here is to ask whether the legislation detrimentally affects the financial framework which induced the bond owners originally to purchase the bonds. Tyrpak, 124 Wn.2d at 153-154.

The $15.00 fee pledged by King County is pledged as collateral. As such, it is part of their contract with the bond holder. The repeal of the statute authorizing the fees pledged as collateral alters the terms of the bond by removing one of the types of security. Removing specific collateral detrimentally affects the financial framework of the contract terms. Consistent with Tyrpak, this court finds that as a matter of law, eliminating part of the collateral pledged to the bond owners for repayment of the money loaned to King County, even if other available revenue remains sufficient, is a substantial impairment of the bond contract. Despite the State's concern that local governments will use last-minute bond pledges to "lock in" their authority, there was no violation of the law. This court declines to interfere with political choices made by the executive branch on the timing of the bond issuance.

I-776's nullification of the local $15.00 fee pledged as part of the collateral for King County bonds is unconstitutional.

The court previously set forth the grounds for all of the constitutional challenges raised by Plaintiffs. These arguments are set forth in the parties' pleadings listed in Appendix B, all of which the court reviewed.

In light of the court's aforementioned rulings, it is not necessary to decide or comment on the remaining challenges to the constitutionality of I-776 since such rulings would be advisory in nature.

Initiatives, like bills from the legislature, are presumed to be constitutional. Any party that challenges the constitutional validity of an initiative must prove such beyond a reasonable doubt. The plaintiffs in this case have met their burden under three constitutional arguments. They have proven the following:
1. Sections 1 and 7 of Initiative 776 violate the Constitution because they introduce a second subject.
2. Sections 1, 7, and 8 violate the Constitution because the subjects in these sections are not identified in the Ballot Title.
3. Section 8 of the Initiative, as applied to King County, violates the Constitution because it nullifies the $15.00 fee pledged as part of the collateral for King County bonds and by doing so impairs the contract between King County and the bond holders. In summary, Initiative 776 as a whole violates the Constitution.

The conclusions of law provided above dictate that this Court grant the following relief: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECLARED, AND ADJUDGED that:
a. Initiative 776 is unconstitutional in its entirety and therefore, cannot be enforced; the State and its subdivisions are hereby permanently enjoined from taking any action to implement or enforce any section of Initiative 776;
b. Because the entire Initiative is unconstitutional, Section 10 does not save any individual section; and
c. The prior order entered by this court on December 4, 2002, has expired upon the issuance of permanent injunctive relief.

The court recognizes the import of the constitutional issues addressed herein, and the likelihood that resolution of those issues will render it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the parties. The need for timely final rulings on the constitutionality of the Initiative in order to remove uncertainty at all levels of government in the State of Washington is necessary. There otherwise being no just reason for delay, this court certifies the forgoing rulings as final judgments under CR 54(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of , 2003.

	Judge Mary I. Yu KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT